

West Virginia Government Money Market Pool

Portfolio Overview as of 03/31/2023


Pool Assets

\$282 Million


Credit Quality Composition (%)



Maturity Schedule (%)



Portfolio Composition (%)



Weighted Average Maturity 10 Days

Top Holdings (%)


Total % of Portfolio	100.0%
Federal Home Loan Mort Corp	3.5%
United States Treasury	5.3%
Federal Farm Credit Bank	12.4%
Bank of America Securities	18.5%
Goldman, Sachs & Co	24.8%
Federal Home Loan Bank	35.4%

The West Virginia Government Money Market Pool is a money market portfolio created to invest restricted moneys of participants in US Treasury and US Government Obligations. The objective of the portfolio is to preserve capital and to maintain sufficient liquidity to meet daily disbursements, while earning a return above inflation. The risk factor is low and managed through numerous maturity restrictions, diversification, guidelines, and credit limits.

Pool Features and Benefits:

- » Professional management is provided by the West Virginia Board of Treasury investments' staff and professional investment advisors (UBS Global Asset Management).
- » Rated AAAm by Standard & Poor's.
- » Seeks to maintain a net asset value (NAV) of \$1 per share.
- » Investment yields are competitive with other government money market accounts.
- » Easy access is provided through the State Treasurer's Office online system.
- » Account can be opened for as little as \$100 with no limit on the number of transactions.
- » Contributions and withdrawals are allowed daily.
- » Income is distributed on a daily basis.

7-Day Simple Money Market Yield (%)



To learn how to make the West Virginia Government Money Market Pool work for your cash investing needs call: 304-340-1564 or visit: wvbti.org

Portfolio holdings and composition are shown as of the date indicated. Since market conditions fluctuate suddenly and frequently, the portfolio holdings may change and this list is not indicative of future portfolio composition. These portfolio holdings are not intended to be and do not constitute recommendations that others buy, sell, or hold any of the securities listed.

An investment in the Pool is not insured or guaranteed by any government or government agency. Although the manager of the Pool seeks to preserve principal, it is possible to lose money by depositing money in the Pool.

An AAAm rating by Standard & Poor's is obtained after S&P evaluates a number of factors, including credit quality, market price exposure and management. Ratings are subject to change and do not remove market risk.

Commentary

When you hear talk of the two functions of the Federal Reserve, you likely think of its so-called "dual mandate" to foster maximum employment and stable prices. But that's the goal of its monetary policy. The Fed's foundational duality is actually to promote both those goals and the stability of the U.S. financial system. The Fed officially states it performs five functions. But one concerns setting policy while the other four fall under the rubric of safety.

This distinction is crucial to understanding the Fed's decision-making following the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB). On the one hand, it acted swiftly to provide a safety net to the banking sector with the establishment of the Bank Term Funding Program. On the other hand, a week or so later, its Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) voted to raise the federal funds rate by 25 basis points.

This might seem contradictory. Although much of SVB's downfall stemmed from an overly concentrated clientele, a classic asset/liability mismatch and other mismanagement, the Fed's aggressive tightening put the bank's holdings of longer-term Treasuries underwater. From this perspective, the Fed perhaps should have foregone a hike. Yet its policy arm essentially shrugged this off. Not just because FOMC officials professed—and likely believed—that risks of contagion spreading to the broader banking system were minute, but because their focus remains on fighting inflation. Of course, Chair Jerome Powell had to address both issues, but he passed the buck on SVB to Vice Chair for Supervision Michael Barr.

The distinction is a major reason we think the FOMC won't shift its foot from the gas to the brake pedal this year. Its members continually show they are willing to deal out pain in the name of restoring price stability. They've admittedly targeted increasing unemployment and tightening financial conditions—an agenda almost guaranteed to break some aspect of the financial system. We forecast another quarter-point hike at the May meeting and no cuts this year. That's what the Summary of Economic Projections show, and betting against the Fed now is unwise. The markets keep flirting with making that bet, 50/50 on a hike in May and still pricing in a pivot this year. But expectations are volatile, and the debt ceiling X date looms. Unsurprisingly, there's been little movement on that front.

At the end of the month, yields on 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-month U.S. Treasuries were 4.58%, 4.76%, 4.89% and 4.69%, respectively; the 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-month Bloomberg Short-Term Bank Yield Index rates (BSBY) were 4.93%, 4.08%, 5.23% and 5.27%, respectively; the 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-month London interbank offered rates were 4.86%, 5.22%, 5.32% and 5.33%, respectively.

